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Abstract Inferential erotetic logic (IEL) and inquisitive semantics (INQ) give
accounts of questions and model various aspects of questioning. In this paper we con-
centrate upon connections between inquisitiveness, being the core concept of INQ, and
question raising, characterized in IEL by means of the concepts of question evocation
and erotetic implication. We consider the basic system InqB of INQ, remain at the
propositional level and show, inter alia, that: (1) a disjunction of all the direct answers
to an evoked question is always inquisitive; (2) a formula is inquisitive if, and only if
it evokes a yes–no question whose affirmative answer expresses a possibility for the
formula; (3) inquisitive formulas evoke questions whose direct answers express all
the possibilities for the formulas, and (4) each question erotetically implies a question
whose direct answers express the possibilities for the direct answers to the implying
question.
Keywords Logic of questions · Inferential erotetic logic · Inquisitive semantics
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on interrelations between two notions: question raising and inquis-
itiveness. The former is in the centre of attention of inferential erotetic logic (IEL),
while the latter is the core concept of inquisitive semantics (INQ).
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1.1 Inquisitive semantics
Inquisitive semantics originated from an analysis of questions, but currently evolves
toward a general theory of meaning. The beginnings of INQ date to the late 1990s.
INQ, however, is currently a research programme rather than a completed theory:
alternative accounts are still being proposed.1
The basic idea of INQ can be briefly expressed as follows: the meaning of a sentence
comprises two components, informative content and inquisitive content. The former
is the information provided by a sentence, the latter is the issue raised by the sentence.
By and large, if the information provided is sufficient to settle the issue that is raised,
the sentence is an assertion. If, however, the information provided is insufficient to
settle the raised issue, the sentence is inquisitive.
For example, the following:
Mary is Peter’s mother. (1)
raises the issue whether Mary is Peter’s mother and provides information that Mary is
Peter’s mother. The information provided settles the issue raised. Now let us consider:
John is Peter’s father or George is Peter′s father. (2)
Sentence (2) raises the issue who is Peter’s father, John or George, while the informa-
tion provided amounts only to the claim that one of above possibilities holds. So (2)
is inquisitive, while (1) is not. Observe that inquisitive sentences are akin to questions
in being carriers of information to be completed.
Both types of contents, as well as the concepts of possibility, assertion and inquis-
itiveness are modelled formally (see below).
In what follows we concentrate upon the “basic”, most often used system of inquis-
itive semantics, labelled as InqB, and we remain at the propositional level only.
1.2 Inferential erotetic logic
Generally speaking, IEL is a logic that analyses inferences in which questions play
the role of conclusions and proposes criteria of validity for these inferences. The idea
originates from the late 1980s.2
IEL starts with a simple observation that in many cases arriving at questions resem-
bles coming to conclusions: there are premises involved and some inferential thought
processes take place. In other words, there exist erotetic inferences, that is, thought
processes in which questions occur as “conclusions”. These inferences are of (at least)
1 For various versions of INQ see, e.g., Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009), Ciardelli and Roelof-
sen (2011), Groenendijk (2011), Ciardelli et al. (2013a, b), Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2014). For
recent developments see: http://sites.google.com/site/inquisitivesemantics/.
2 The monograph Wis´niewski (1995) summarizes results obtained until early nineties, while the book
Wis´niewski (2013) provides a state-of-the-art exposition of IEL. For a concise introduction see Wis´niewski
(2001) or Wis´niewski (1996).
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two kinds, depending on the type of premises involved. In the case of an erotetic infer-
ence of the first kind the set of premises consists of declarative sentence(s) only, and
an agent passes from it to a question. For example:
(I) Mary is Peter’s mother.
If Mary is Peter’s mother, then John is
Peter’s father or George is Peter’s father.
Who is Peter’s father: John or George?
The premises of an erotetic inference of the second kind comprise a question and
possibly some declarative sentence(s). For instance:
(II) Where did Andrew leave for?
If Andrew took his famous umbrella, then he left for London;
otherwise he left for Paris or Moscow.
Did Andrew take his famous umbrella?
Erotetic inferences in which no declarative premise occurs can be regarded as a special
case of erotetic inferences of the second kind. Here is an example of an appropriate
erotetic inference which does not rely on any declarative premise:
(III) Did Andrew travel by BA, or by Ryanair, or by neither?
Did Andrew travel by BA?
Some erotetic inferences are intuitively valid, while others are not. The following
can serve as a preliminary test of intuitive validity: put the expression “so the question
arises” just before the conclusion. If the resultant description of an erotetic inference
is undoubtedly true, the inference can be regarded as intuitively valid. The reader is
advised to perform the test with respect to the examples of erotetic inferences presented
above, and then with respect to:
(IV) Mary is Peter’s mother.
If Mary is Peter’s mother, then John is Peter’s father.
Is John Peter’s father?
and
(V) Where did Andrew leave for?
If Andrew took his famous umbrella, then he left for London;
otherwise he left for Paris or Moscow.
Is Andrew smart enough?
Clearly, (I), (II) and (III) pass the test, in contradistinction to (IV) or (V). However,
there are cases in which one does not get indisputable results. On the other hand,
validity is a normative notion, and, as long as erotetic inferences are concerned, is
given neither by God nor by Tradition. So some arbitrary decisions have to be made.
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IEL proceeds as follows. First, some criteria of validity are proposed, separately
for each kind of erotetic inference (for details see, e.g., Wis´niewski 2013, Chapter 5).
Then two semantic relations are defined: evocation of questions by sets of declarative
sentences/formulas, and erotetic implication of a question by a question together with
a set of declarative sentences/formulas. Validity of erotetic inferences of the first kind
is defined in terms of evocation; at the same time the definition of evocation provides
an explication of the intuitive notion “a question Q arises from a set of declarative
sentences X”. As for erotetic inferences of the second kind, their validity is defined
in terms of erotetic implication (of the question being the conclusion by the question
which is the premise on the basis of the declarative premise(s) involved). The proposed
definition of erotetic implication is an explication of the intuitive notion “a question Q
arises from a question Q1 on the basis of a set of declarative sentences X”.3 In view of
IEL question raising (explicated in terms of evocation and erotetic implication) and
validity of erotetic inferences are two sides of the same coin.
Both erotetic implication and question evocation are purely semantic concepts. In
order to define them one needs, inter alia, a certain concept of entailment for declara-
tives. However, in its general setting IEL is neutral in the controversy concerning what
“The Logic” of declaratives is. One can use Classical Logic, but non-classical logics
are also permitted. In this paper we will be dealing with the simplest case, that is, with
evocation and erotetic implication based on Classical Propositional Logic.
1.3 IEL versus InqB
IEL and InqB are conceptually incommensurable. IEL distinguishes questions from
declaratives syntactically, while InqB does not do this. InqB defines the basic semantic
categories in terms of support, being a relation between a formula and a set of possible
worlds/an information state. IEL, in turn, operates with the concept of truth as the
basic one. However, despite conceptual differences, both theories give accounts of
the phenomenon of question/issue raising, though the phenomenon is viewed by them
from different angles. InqB explicates the intuitive notion of a possibility “offered” by
a sentence, distinguishes sentences which offer at least two possibilities and, in effect,
gives a semantic characteristics of expressions that call for supplementary information.
However, InqB does not provide a systematic account of arriving at issues/questions.
IEL, in turn, focuses on semantic relations between questions and the contexts of
their appearance. So it seems that IEL and INQ can benefit from their meeting, both
conceptually and in further developments. In this paper we present some formal results
which may be viewed as arguments in favour of the above claim.
1.4 Outline of the paper
The perspective adopted in this paper is the following. As in IEL, and unlike
InqB, we consider a (propositional) language which has two disjoint categories of
3 Let us stress: IEL does not provide analytic definitions of the above concepts of “arising”, but their expli-
cations (in the sense of Carnap; see Carnap 1950, pp. 1–18). For details see Wis´niewski (1995, Chapter 1).
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well-formed expressions: declarative well-formed formulas and questions. The latter
are defined purely syntactically. In other words, the language has a “declarative part”
and an “erotetic part”. We supplement the declarative part (but not the erotetic part!)
with an inquisitive semantics which is, basically, InqB. Since the standard concepts
of truth and entailment are definable in InqB, this step enables us to operate with
inquisitive as well as standard semantic concepts, in particular to define “classical”
question evocation and erotetic implication.
In Sect. 2 we provide an exposition of the basics of InqB and we introduce the
semantic concepts used throughout the paper. In Sect. 3 we describe how questions
are conceptualized in InqB and in IEL, and we point out some affinities between the
so-called proper questions and inquisitive formulas of a special form. Section 4 is
devoted to question evocation and its connections with inquisitiveness. We show that
a disjunction of all the direct answers to an evoked question is always inquisitive, and
that the evoked questions are just the questions whose disjunctions of asserted direct
answers are inquisitive. We prove that a formula is inquisitive if, and only if the for-
mula evokes a yes–no question whose affirmative answer expresses a possibility for
the formula. We also show that an inquisitive formula evokes a question whose direct
answers express all the possibilities for the formula. In Sect. 5 we turn to erotetic impli-
cation, explain the underlying intuitions and present the definition. Then we prove that
each question (of the language considered) erotetically implies a question whose direct
answers express all the possibilities for the direct answers to the implying question.
2 InqB
2.1 Possible worlds, states, and support
As for InqB, we consider a (non-modal) propositional language LP over a non-empty
set of propositional variables P , where P is either finite or countably infinite. The
primitive logical constants of the language are: ⊥,∨,∧,→. Well-formed formulas
(wffs) of LP are defined as usual.
The letters A, B, C, D, with or without subscripts, are metalanguage variables for
wffs of LP , and the letters X, Y are metalanguage variables for sets of wffs of the
language. The letter p is used below as a metalanguage variable for propositional
variables.
LP is supposed to be associated with the set of suitable possible worlds, WP ,
being the model of LP . A possible world, in turn, is conceived either as a subset of
P or as a valuation of P . Regardless of which of these solutions is adopted, WP is
uniquely determined. When possible worlds are conceptualized as sets of propositional
variables, WP = ℘(P), that is, WP is the power set of P . If, however, possible worlds
are identified with indices, that is, valuations of P , then WP is the set of all indices.
Subsets of WP are called states. States are thus sets of possible worlds. One can
think of such sets as modelling information states. Singleton sets/states correspond
to information states of maximal consistent information, while WP corresponds to
the ignorant state, i.e. an information state in which no possible world is excluded. ∅
represents the absurd state.
The letters σ, τ, γ , with or without subscripts, will refer to states.
123
1590 Synthese (2015) 192:1585–1608
The most important semantic relation between states and wffs is that of support. In
the case of InqB support, , is defined by:
Definition 1 (Support) Let σ ⊆ WP .
1. σ  p iff for each w ∈ σ : p is true in w,
2. σ  ⊥ iff σ = ∅,
3. σ  (A ∧ B) iff σ  A and σ  B,
4. σ  (A ∨ B) iff σ  A or σ  B,
5. σ  (A → B) iff for each τ ⊆ σ : if τ  A then τ  B.
When WP comprises indices, “p is true in w” means “the value ofp under w equals
1”. When WP = ℘(P), the meaning is: “p ∈ w”.
Inquisitive negation is introduced by:
¬A =d f (A → ⊥)
Thus we get:
(neg) σ  ¬A iff for each τ ⊆ σ such that τ 
= ∅ : τ 
 A.
The definition of support by a state generalizes the standard definition of truth in a
world. To see this, it suffices to put σ = {w} and then replace “{w}  A” with “A is
true in w”. We get the usual clauses defining truth of a wff in a world. However, the
generalization is non-trivial. Support by a state does not amount to truth in each world
of the state: the clauses for disjunction and implication (and also negation) are more
demanding. The following holds:
Lemma 1 (Persistence) If σ  A, then τ  A for any τ ⊆ σ .
As a consequence we get:
Corollary 1 If σ  A, then {w}  A for each w ∈ σ .
However, the converse of Corollary 1 does not hold. As an illustration, consider a
state {w, v} such that p is true in w, q is false in w, p is false in v and q is true in v.
The wff p ∨q is true both in w and in v, but, due to clauses (1) and (4) of Definition 1,
{w, v} does not support p ∨ q.
The truth set of a wff A, in symbols: |A|, is the set of all the worlds from WP in
which A is true, where the concept of truth is understood classically. More formally,
|A| = {w ∈ WP : {w}  A}.
2.2 Meaning, inquisitiveness, and possibilities
In view of INQ the meaning of a sentence has two aspects: informative content and
inquisitive content. Roughly, the former is identified with the information provided,
while the latter is the issue raised.
The informative content of a wff A, in f o(A), is defined as follows:
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Definition 2 (Informative content) in f o(A) = ⋃{σ ⊆ WP : σ  A}
The inquisitive content of a wff A, [A], is defined by:
Definition 3 (Inquisitive content) [A] = {σ ⊆ in f o(A) : σ  A}
Since support is understood in InqB in the sense of Definition 1,4 we get:
in f o(A) = |A|
that is, the informative content of A equals the truth set of A.5 It follows that in the
case of InqB we have:
[A] = {σ ⊆ |A| : σ  A}
The empty set is regarded as a state and thus, by Corollary 1 and Definition 3, [A]
is a non-empty downward closed set of subsets of |A|. Inquisitive semantics considers
such sets as propositions expressed by wffs. Note that the concept of proposition is
“lifted”: propositions conceived in this way are not sets of possible worlds, but sets of
states, that is, sets of sets of possible worlds.
When one starts with the concept of proposition as the basic one (i.e. the proposition
expressed by A construed as a non-empty downward closed set of subsets of |A|),
the structure 〈,⊆〉, where  is the set of all propositions that belong to ℘(WP ),
is a Heyting algebra with a (pseudo)complementation operation ◦ characterized by:
A◦ =d f {β : β ∩ ⋃A = ∅}, and relative pseudocomplementation, ⇒, defined
by: A ⇒ B =d f {α : f or every β ⊆ α, i f β ∈ A then β ∈ B}. This provides
an algebraic justification for the clauses of the definition of support. For details see
Roelofsen (2013).
A wff A is inquisitive when, and only when its informative content is not an element
of its inquisitive content, that is, the (full) informative content of A does not support
A. To be more precise:
Definition 4 (Inquisitiveness) A wff A is inquisitive iff in f o(A) 
 A.
For InqB, however, this reduces to:
|A| /∈ [A].
Wffs which are not inquisitive are called assertions.
Here are examples of inquisitive wffs:6
4 There are systems of inquisitive semantics in which support is defined differently; see Groenendijk (2011),
Ciardelli et al. (2013a, b), Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2014).
5 In more traditional terms: the informative content of A amounts to the proposition expressed by A.
6 As for (3), |p ∨ q| = {w ∈ WP : w(p) = 1 or w(q) = 1}. But |p ∨ q| 
 p ∨ q, since it is neither the
case that |p ∨ q|  p nor it is the case that |p ∨ q|  q. (Recall that |p ∨ q|  p iff w(p) = 1 for each
w ∈ |p∨q|, and similarly for q. Neither of these cases hold.) Concerning (4): clearly |p∨¬p| = WP . But,
again, we neither have w(p) = 1 for every w ∈ WP nor we have w(p) 
= 1 for each world w belonging
to a non-empty subset of WP . Hence |p ∨ ¬p| does not support p ∨ ¬p and thus |p ∨ ¬p| /∈ [p ∨ ¬p],
that is, (4) is inquisitive.
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p ∨ q (3)
p ∨ ¬p (4)
Observe that (4) is a classical tautology, i.e. |p ∨ ¬p| = WP . However, not every
classical tautology is inquisitive—for example ¬(p ∧ ¬p) is not. Thus inquisitive
semantics enables a differentiation among tautologies: some of them are inquisitive,
while other are assertions.
When we remain at the propositional level, InqB-inquisitive contents of wffs have
maximal elements, called possibilities. To be more precise:
Definition 5 (Possibility) A possibility for wff A is a state σ ⊆ WP such that σ  A
and for each w 
∈ σ : σ ∪ {w} 
 A.
If a wff is inquisitive, the set of possibilities for the wff comprises at least two
elements.
For example, let us consider:
(p ∨ q) ∨ ¬(p ∨ q) (5)
The set of possibilities for (5) is:
{|p|, |q|, |¬p| ∩ |¬q|} (6)
Note that |p| and |q| (partially) overlap.
It can be proven that each state supporting a wff A is a subset of some possibility
for A.7 Hence it follows that, in particular, each world that belongs to the truth set of
a wff A belongs to some possibility for A (see also Lemma 5 below).
2.3 Entailment
Entailment is defined in INQ in terms of inclusion: A (inquisitively) entails B iff
in f o(A) ⊆ in f o(B) and [A] ⊆ [B]. As for InqB, however, [A] ⊆ [B] yields
in f o(A) ⊆ in f o(B). Thus in the case of InqB inquisitive entailment, |inq , can
be defined by:
Definition 6 (Inquisitive entailment) X |inq A iff ⋂
B∈X
[B] ⊆ [A].
Note that the underlying idea is the transmission of support. Needless to say, classical
entailment, |cl , can be defined as follows:
Definition 7 (Classical entailment) X |cl A iff ⋂
B∈X
|B| ⊆ |A|.
Clearly, the following holds:
Corollary 2 |inq ⊂ |cl .
7 This result may be found in Ciardelli (2009, pp. 9–10), and Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2011, pp. 59–60).
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We also need the concept of multiple-conclusion entailment,8 being a relation
between sets of wffs. Roughly, X multiple-conclusion entails (mc-entails for short) Y
if, and only if the truth of all the wffs in X warrants that at least one wff in Y is true.
In the case of Classical Propositional Logic we express the idea by:






Generally speaking, questions/interrogatives can be incorporated into a formal lan-
guage in two ways.
1. (The “Define within” approach.) One can embed questions into a language. To be
more precise, one can regard as questions some already given well-formed formulas
differentiated by some semantic feature(s), or construe questions as meanings of some
specific (but already given) well-formed formulas.
This way of proceeding is natural when the so-called paraphrase approach to ques-
tions is adopted, that is, it is believed that the meaning of an interrogative sentence can
be adequately characterized by a paraphrase that specifies the typical use of the sen-
tence or the relevant illocutionary act performed in uttering the sentence. For example,
one can claim that the following:
Does John like Mary? (7)
is synonymous with:
Bring it about that I know whether John likes Mary. (8)
or with:
I request that you assert that John likes Mary or deny that he likes Mary. (9)
The paraphrase (8) can be formalized within a setting which involves epistemic oper-
ators and imperative operator(s). (9), in turn, can be formalized within a logical theory
of illocutionary acts. In both cases no separate, primary syntactic category of inter-
rogatives is needed. For convenience, one can then define “interrogative formulas”,
but they will be only abbreviations of their counterparts, and, what is more important,
their semantics is just the semantics of the relevant well-formed formulas.9
8 For this concept see, e.g., Shoesmith and Smiley (1978).
9 (8) is a Hintikka-style paraphrase, while (9) agrees with Vanderveeken’s approach to questions. The survey
paper Harrah (2002) provides a comprehensive exposition of logical theories of questions elaborated up
until late 1990s. Supplementary information about more linguistically oriented approaches can be found,
e.g., in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1997) (reprinted as Groenendijk and Stokhof 2011) and Krifka (2011).
The paper Ginzburg (2011) provides a survey of recent developments in the research on questions, both
in logic and in linguistics. A general overview of approaches to questions and their semantics can also be
found in Wis´niewski (2015).
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2. (The “Enrich with” approach.) One can enrich a language with questions/
interrogatives. In order to achieve this, one adds to the vocabulary some question-
forming expressions and then introduces questions/interrogatives syntactically, as a
new category of well-formed formulas. The new category is disjoint with the remaining
categories. This way of proceeding is natural when questions are conceived in accor-
dance with the independent meaning thesis, according to which the meaning/semantic
content of an interrogative sentence cannot be adequately characterized in terms of
semantics of expressions that belong to other categories.
IEL proceeds in accordance with the “enrich with” approach, while InqB adopts
the “define within” approach.10 However, InqB postulates no paraphrase of questions
in terms of expressions of other categories; questions and assertions are distinguished
semantically among expressions which are traditionally construed as declaratives (see
below).
3.1 Questions in InqB
The language LP does not include a separate syntactic category of questions/
interrogatives. However, some wffs are regarded as having the property of being a
question, or Q-property for short. Recall that WP stands for the model of LP , and
|A| for the truth set of wff A in WP (cf. Sect. 2.1).
Definition 9 (Being a question) A wff A of LP has the Q-property iff |A| = WP .
The Q-property is simply the complement of informativeness defined as follows:
Definition 10 (Informativeness) A wff A of LP is informative iff |A| 
= WP .
Hence a wff A is (i.e. has the property of being) a question when, and only when
A is not informative, that is, A is true in each possible world of WP . Thus the wffs
having the Q-property are just classical tautologies. Yet, as we have already observed,
InqB enables a differentiation among classical tautologies: some of them are inquis-
itive, and some are not. So there exist inquisitive questions and non-inquisitive ques-
tions.
Recall that the set of possibilities for an inquisitive wff has at least two elements.
So if an inquisitive wff, A, has the Q-property (i.e. “is” a question), then there exist
at least two possibilities for A and, by non-informativeness, the truth set of A equals
WP .
One can easily prove that A has the Q-property iff A and A ∨ ¬A are inquisi-
tively equivalent, i.e. inquisitively entail each other. The interrogative operator, ?, is
introduced by:
?A =d f A ∨ ¬A (10)
10 Yet, there exist systems of INQ which adopt the “enrich with” approach; see Groenendijk (2011),
Ciardelli et al. (2013b), Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2014).
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One should not confuse (10) with a syntactic characterization of questions/
interrogatives. Also, it is not claimed that each question is a yes–no question. Since
the Q-property is the complement of informativeness, no question of LP is informa-
tive. However, this is not characteristic to inquisitive semantics in general: there are
systems in which the “non-informativeness” requirement is abandoned.11
3.2 Questions in IEL
IEL adopts the “enrich with” approach to questions, although in its general setting does
not predetermine how to shape them. On the level of a logical analysis it is assumed
that questions are specific expressions of a formal language, and that to each question
considered there is assigned an at least two-element set of direct answers. Direct
answers are supposed to be declarative formulas (sentences in the first or higher-
order case). In the general considerations it is also assumed that each finite and at
least two-element set of declarative formulas/sentences constitutes the set of direct
answers to a question of a formal language under consideration. One can build formal
languages having the above features according to different patterns, for example by
using Belnap’s (Belnap and Steel 1976) or Kubin´ski’s (Kubin´ski 1980) accounts of
questions/interrogatives, or according to the semi-reductionistic schema proposed in
Wis´niewski (1995) or Wis´niewski (2013).
In this paper we apply a formal account of propositional questions which is pre-
sumably the simplest one possible.12
3.2.1 Questions as erotetic wffs
We augment the vocabulary of LP with the following signs: ?, {, }, and the comma.
We get a new language, L?P , which has two categories of well-formed formulas:
declarative well-formed formulas (d-wffs) and erotetic well-formed formulas, that is,
questions.
A d-wff of L?P is a wff of LP .
A question of L?P is an expression of the form:
?{A1, . . . , An} (11)
where n > 1 and A1, . . . , An are nonequiform, that is, pairwise syntactically distinct,
d-wffs of L?P (i.e. wffs of LP ). Each of the d-wffs A1, . . . , An is a direct answer to
question (11), and these are the only direct answers to the question. Note that it is not
assumed that direct answers must be true.
Each question of L?P has at least two direct answers. At the same time the set
of direct answers to a question is always finite. Note that questions of L?P are well-
formed expressions of the language. One cannot identify a question with the set of
direct answers to it. For instance, ?{p, q} 
= ?{q, p}.
11 This holds for the so-called presuppositional inquisitive semantics; see Ciardelli et al. (2013b, Section 6).
12 We follow Wis´niewski (1995, Chapter 3); see also Wis´niewski (2013, Chapter 2).
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An expression of the form (11) can be read:
Is it the case that A1, or . . . , or is it the case that An? (12)
Let us stress: one should not confuse (12) with the grammatical form of natural-
language questions formalized by it. The underlying idea is: an agent (a questioner or
an answerer) regards some sentences as “principal possible answers”, that is, answers
providing neither less nor more information than the question under consideration calls
for (“just-sufficient answers” for short), and these sentences are formally represented
by the direct answers to the corresponding question of a formal language. A1, . . . , An
are simply the wffs which formalize just-sufficient answers differentiated in this way.13
However, in many cases what is regarded by an agent as “just-sufficient” depends not
only on the form of the question, but, in addition, on contextual/pragmatic factors. It
also happens that an agent does not see or bother that some of the answers regarded by
him/her as just-sufficient entail other(s) (as in, e.g., “Who is John: a philosopher, or a
philosopher or a theologian?”) or even are logically equivalent. IEL differentiates such
“faulty” questions at the semantic level, remaining very liberal at the level of syntax.
For the sake of generality no objective, logical concept of “just-sufficiency” underlies
the account of questions proposed: faulty questions asked by irrational agents are not
ignored.
The schema (11) is general enough to capture most (if not all) of propositional
questions studied in the literature.
Notation. We will use Q, Q∗, Q1, . . . as metalanguage variables for questions of L?P .
The set of direct answers to a question Q will be referred to as dQ.
For the sake of concision we adopt some notational conventions pertaining to ques-
tions of L?P which we will frequently refer to. Questions of the form:
13 For example, any of the following:
?{p, q} (13)
?{p ∧ ¬q,¬p ∧ q} (14)
?{p ∧ ¬q,¬p ∧ q, p ∧ q} (15)
?{p, q,¬(p ∨ q)} (16)
corresponds to a question expressed by the interrogative sentence:
Is John a philosopher, or a logician? (17)
If (17) is understood so that a single choice among the alternatives given is sufficient for answering the
relevant question, the question is represented by (13). If an exclusive choice is requested, the representation is
(14). If a complete choice is requested, the question is represented by (15). If, however, the question expressed
by (17) is construed as allowing that neither of the alternatives holds, it has (16) as its representation.
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?{A ∧ B, A ∧ ¬B,¬A ∧ B,¬A ∧ ¬B} (18)
will be abbreviated as:
? ± |A, B| (19)
Simple yes–no questions of L?P (i.e. questions of the form ?{A,¬A}) will be concisely
written as:
?A (20)
3.3 “Translating” InqB-questions into questions of L?P
Let A be a d-wff having the Q-property, that is, a question of LP . One can always
find a question Q of L?P such that the family of all the truth sets of direct answers toQ is just the set of possibilities for A.
The idea is simple. Let A be an inquisitive question of LP . For simplicity, assume
that P is a finite set. So the number of states is finite as well. A is, by assumption,
inquisitive, so the number of possibilities is greater than 1, but still finite. We calculate
the possibilities for A. Each possibility will be the truth set of some wff of LP .14
For each possibility obtained we choose exactly one wff such that the possibility is
just the truth set of the wff.15 Since the possibilities are distinct, we get at least two-
element set of nonequiform d-wffs. Finally, we consider these d-wffs as direct answers
to the corresponding question of L?P . For instance, (6) is the set of possibilities for(5). Therefore (5) translates, inter alia, into:
?{p, q,¬(p ∨ q)} (21)
What about non-inquisitive questions of LP? If A is a non-inquisitive question of
the language, |A| equals WP , since A is a classical tautology. We choose a tautology,
B, which is syntactically distinct from A. The question ?{A, B} corresponds to A.16
3.4 Proper questions of L?P and inquisitiveness
In this section we point out some close connections between the so-called proper
questions and inquisitiveness. Proper questions constitute the most important semantic
category of questions in IEL.
14
“Any formula can be represented as a disjunction of assertions in such a way that its possibilities coincide
with the classical meaning of the disjuncts” (Ciardelli 2009, pp. 19–20.) The result is explicitly proven in
Ciardelli (2009) for finite P’s, but, obviously, the finiteness assumption is dispensable. See also Lemma 6
in Sect. 4.3.
15 Observe that |¬p| ∩ |¬q| is the truth set of both ¬(p ∨ q) and ¬p ∧ ¬q. In general, a possibility is
always the truth set of many CL-equivalent wffs.
16 We owe this observation to an anonymous referee.
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We need some auxiliary notions.
Following Belnap (see Belnap and Steel 1976, pp. 119–120), we say that a d-wff
B is a presupposition of a question Q iff B is entailed by each direct answer to Q. By
PresQ we designate the set of all the presuppositions of Q.
Definition 11 (Self-rhetorical question) A question Q is self-rhetorical iff PresQ
entails some direct answer(s) to Q.
The underlying idea is: a self-rhetorical question is a question that is already
resolved by its presupposition(s).
As long as the language L?P is concerned, ‘entails’ means ‘CL-entails’. We have:
Corollary 3 Let dQ = {A1, . . . , An}. Q is self-rhetorical iff |A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An| ⊆ |A|
for some A ∈ dQ.
In the case of L?P proper questions are defined by:17
Definition 12 (Proper question of L?P ) A question Q of L?P is proper iff Q is not
self-rhetorical.
One can prove:
Lemma 2 If ?{A1, . . . , An} is proper, then A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An is inquisitive.
Proof Assume that A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An is not inquisitive. Hence:
|A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An|  A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An (22)
Therefore for some i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
|A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An|  Ai (23)
But if |B|  A, then B |cl A. Thus (23) yields:
|A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An| ⊆ |Ai | (24)
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. unionsq
Note that Lemma 2 cannot be strengthened to equivalence. For consider the for-
mula:
(p ∨ ¬p) ∨ (q ∨ ¬q) (25)
(25) is inquisitive, but ?{p ∨ ¬p, q ∨ ¬q} is not a proper question.
17 Proper questions are defined in IEL as normal questions which are not self-rhetorical; a question is normal
iff the set of its presuppositions is non-empty and mc-entails the set of direct answers to the question. Since
each question of L?P is normal, in the case of L?P the definition simplifies.
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In order to go further we have to introduce the assertion operator, !. As in InqB, we
define:
!A =d f ¬¬A (26)
Note that !A is always an assertion. Moreover, the following holds:
Corollary 4 σ  !A iff {w}  !A for each w ∈ σ .
We have:18
Lemma 3 ?{A1, . . . , An} is proper iff !A1 ∨ · · · ∨ !An is inquisitive.
Proof For conciseness, let us abbreviate:
!A1 ∨ · · · ∨ !An (27)
as !A(1,n).
(⇒) Suppose that !A(1,n) is not inquisitive. Hence |!A(1,n)|  !A(1,n). Thus |!A(1,n)| 
!Ai for some i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and therefore !A(1,n) |cl !Ai . It follows that
A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An |cl Ai , that is, ?{A1, . . . , An} is not proper.
(⇐) If !A(1,n) is inquisitive, then |!A(1,n)| 
 !A(1,n). Hence |!A(1,n)| 
 !Ai for i =
1, . . . , n. Thus, by Corollary 4, for each i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists w ∈ |!A(1,n)|
such that {w} 
 Ai . Therefore A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An 
|cl Ai for i = 1, . . . , n, that is,
?{A1, . . . , An} is proper. unionsq
Lemma 3 shows that a question of L?P is proper if, and only if a disjunction of all its
“asserted” direct answers is inquisitive. This sheds new light on the concept of proper
question.
As for transitions from questions of L?P to questions of LP , Lemma 3 yields that a
proper question of L?P is akin to an inquisitive question of LP of the form (27) provided
that the wff (27) is not informative (since each question of LP is, by definition, non-
informative).19 Needless to say, in the case of some questions of L?P the respective
d-wffs falling under the schema (27) are informative (a simple example: ?{p, q}).
Terminology. From now on, unless otherwise stated, by questions we will mean
questions of L?P , and similarly for d-wffs.
4 Evocation of questions
4.1 Definition of evocation
Evocation of questions is a binary relation between sets of d-wffs and questions. The
idea underlying the definition of evocation proposed in IEL is very simple. A question
18 We owe this observation to a remark of an anonymous referee.
19 But recall that there are systems of inquisitive semantics in which this requirement is abandoned; see
footnote 11.
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Q is evoked by a set of d-wffs X when, and only when the truth of all the d-wffs in
X warrants the existence of a true direct answer to Q, but does not warrant the truth
of any single direct answer to Q. In other words, if X consists of truths, at least one
direct answer to Q must be true, but the issue “which one” remains unresolved.
The notion of multiple-conclusion entailment allows us to express the above intu-
ition in exact terms. Let || stand for mc-entailment (see Sect. 2.3).
Definition 13 (Evocation) A set of d-wffs X evokes a question Q (in symbols:
E(X, Q)) iff
1. X || dQ, and
2. X |
| {A} for each A ∈ dQ.
By putting ||cl in the place of || we get the definition of CL-evocation. It will be
referred to as Ecl .
In the case of L?P (but not in the general case!) we can get rid of mc-entailment.
Corollary 5 Ecl(X, ?{A1, . . . An}) iff X |cl A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An and X 
|cl A for each
A ∈ {A1, . . . An}.
Let us note:
Lemma 4 A question Q of L?P is proper iff Q is CL-evoked by a certain set of d-wffs
of L?P .
Proof Let Q = ?{A1, . . . , An}.
Clearly, if Q is proper, then Ecl(A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An, Q).
If Ecl(X, Q), then X |cl A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An and X 
|cl A for each A ∈ dQ. Suppose
that Q is not proper. Therefore A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An |cl A for some A ∈ dQ and hence
X |cl A. A contradiction. unionsq
4.1.1 Examples of evocation
As before, p, q, r are propositional variables of LP . For the sake of brevity, in what
follows we use object-language expressions as their metalanguage names, and we
characterize sets by listing their elements.
Ecl(p ∨ ¬p, ?p) (28)
Ecl(p ∨ q, ?p) (29)
Ecl(p → q, ?p) (30)
Ecl(p → q, ?q) (31)
Ecl(p ∨ q, ?{p, q}) (32)
Ecl(p ∨ q, ?(p ∧ q)) (33)
Ecl(p → q ∨ r, p, ?{q, r}) (34)
Ecl(p ∧ q → r,¬r, ?{¬p,¬q}) (35)
Ecl(p ∧ (q ∨ r), ?{p ∧ q, p ∧ r}) (36)
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For properties of CL-evocation and further examples see, e.g., Wis´niewski (1995,
2001, 2013). For alternative accounts see Meheus (1999, 2001).
4.2 Evocation and inquisitiveness
One can easily prove that a disjunction of all the direct answers to an evoked question
is always inquisitive. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 we immediately get:
Corollary 6 If ?{A1, . . . , An} is CL-evoked by a certain set of d-wffs, then A1 ∨· · ·∨
An is inquisitive.
Corollary 6 cannot be strengthened to equivalence. But we have:20
Theorem 1 Let ?{A1, . . . , An} be a question of L?P . ?{A1, . . . , An} is CL-evoked by
a certain set of d-wffs iff !A1 ∨ · · · ∨ !An is inquisitive.
Proof By Lemmas 3 and 4. unionsq
4.3 Inquisitiveness and evocation
As for propositional InqB, each inquisitive wff “offers” at least two possibilities, that
is, maximal states that support the wff. Moreover, the following hold:
Lemma 5 Let A be a d-wff. If w ∈ |A|, then there is a possibility for A such that w
belongs to this possibility.
As we have already observed (see footnote 7), Lemma 5 follows from some results
established in Ciardelli (2009) and Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2011).
Lemma 6 If A is an inquisitive d-wff, then: (a) the set of possibilities for A is finite,
and (b) for each possibility γ for A there exists a d-wff B such that |B| equals γ .
The above lemma follows from the existence of disjunctive normal forms in InqB.
For details see Ciardelli (2009, p. 39), or Ciardelli and Roelofsen (2011, p. 69).
Let us first prove that a d-wff is inquisitive if, and only if it CL-evokes a yes–no
question whose affirmative answer expresses a possibility for the d-wff.
Theorem 2 Let |B| constitute a possibility for a d-wff A. A is inquisitive iff
Ecl(A, ?B).
Proof (⇒) Clearly A ||cl {B,¬B}.
Since |B| is a possibility for A, we have |B|  A. If |A| ⊆ |B|, then, by Lemma 1,




Now observe that when A is inquisitive, each possibility for A must be non-empty
(because if ∅ is a possibility for A, it is the only possibility for A).
20 Similarly as in the case of Lemma 3, we owe this observation to an anonymous referee.
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Since |B| is a possibility for A, we have |B|  A. Suppose that A |cl ¬B. Thus
B |cl ¬A. Since |B| 
= ∅, it follows that there exists w ∈ WP such that A is true in
w and its classical negation, ¬A, is true in w, which is impossible. Hence A 
|cl ¬B
and thus A |
|cl {¬B}.
(⇐) If Ecl(A, ?B), then A 
|cl B and A 
|cl ¬B. Hence |A| 
= ∅ as well as |B| 
= ∅.
Thus, by Lemma 5, there exist non-empty possibilities for A and for B.
Assume that |B| is the only possibility for A. Hence in f o(A) = |B| and thus
|A| = |B|. It follows that A |cl B and therefore A does not CL-evoke ?B.
A contradiction. Thus |B| is not the only possibility for A. It follows that A is inquis-
itive. unionsq
Comment. Observe that |B| in the assumption of Theorem 2 is an arbitrary possibility
for A. Thus a philosophical comment on Theorem 2 is this: a d-wff is inquisitive if,
and only if it raises (in the sense of CL-evocation) yes–no questions about possibilities
for the d-wff. This sheds new light on the concept of inquisitiveness (in InqB).
Next, it can be proven that an inquisitive d-wff raises (i.e. CL-evokes) a question
whose direct answers express all the possibilities for the d-wff.
Theorem 3 Let A be an inquisitive d-wff. If {|B1|, . . . , |Bn|} is the set of possibilities
for A, then Ecl(A, ?{B1, . . . , Bn}).
Proof If A is inquisitive, then the set of possibilities has at least two elements and, by
Lemma 6, is a finite set. Moreover, again by Lemma 6, each possibility for A is the
truth set of some d-wff.
Suppose that {|B1|, . . . , |Bn|} is the set of possibilities for A.
Let w ∈ |A|. Hence {w}  A. By Lemma 5, w belongs to some possibility for A.
Since |B1|, . . . , |Bn| exhaust the set of possibilities for A, w belongs to some |Bi | and
hence to |B1∨· · ·∨Bn|. Therefore A |cl B1∨· · ·∨Bn and thus A ||cl {B1, . . . , Bn}.
If A is inquisitive and |Bi |, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a possibility for A, then |A| 
⊆ |Bi |,
and hence A |
|cl {Bi }.
Thus Ecl(A, ?{B1, . . . , Bn}) holds. unionsq
Comment. One can expect an inquisitive wff to raise a question “about” all the possi-
bilities for the wff, that is, a question whose direct answers express all the possibilities
for the formula. The claim of Theorem 3 amounts exactly to this, but the concepts
used belong to IEL.
Let us now prove:
Theorem 4 Let A be an inquisitive d-wff, and let |B1|, |B2| constitute distinct possi-
bilities for A. Then Ecl(A, ? ± |B1, B2|).
Proof Since A is inquisitive and |B1|, |B2| are possibilities for A, it follows that
|A| 
⊆ |Bi | for i = 1, 2. Hence A |
|cl {Bi }.
For conciseness, let us designate ‘? ± |B1, B2|’ by Q∗. Recall that dQ∗ = {B1 ∧
B2, B1 ∧ ¬B2,¬B1 ∧ B2,¬B1 ∧ ¬B2}. It is easily seen that a disjunction of all the
elements of dQ∗ is a classical tautology. Therefore A ||cl dQ∗.
Since A |
|cl {Bi } for i = 1, 2, we have A |
|cl C for any C ∈ dQ∗ different from
¬B1 ∧ ¬B2. Suppose that the latter is CL-entailed by A. It follows that A |cl ¬Bi
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for i = 1, 2, and hence Bi |cl ¬A. On the other hand, |Bi |  A and thus Bi |cl
A. Therefore |B1| = ∅ and |B2| = ∅. Hence |B1| = |B2|, which contradicts the
assumption. Therefore A |
|cl {¬B1 ∧ ¬B2}. Thus for each C ∈ dQ∗ : A |
|cl {C}.
unionsq
Generally speaking, ? ± |B1, B2| is a “partition” question that asks which of the
possibilities offered by A and expressed by B1, B2 holds, and allows both of them as
well as neither of them to hold.
Comment. Direct answers to the CL-evoked questions referred to in the above the-
orems express either possibilities or boolean combinations of possibilities for the
evoking (inquisitive) d-wffs. This is not a general rule, however. The following:
Ecl(p, ?q) (37)
provides a simple (counter)example. But questions about possibilities and/or their
boolean combinations seem to constitute the most natural category of questions CL-
evoked/raised by inquisitive d-wffs.
5 Erotetic implication
Validity of erotetic inferences which have questions as premises and conclusions is
defined in IEL by means of erotetic implication, being a ternary semantic relation
between a question, a (possibly empty) set of d-wffs, and a question. By defining
erotetic implication we explicate the intuitive notion “a question arises from a question
on the basis of a set of declarative sentences”.
5.1 Intuitions
Let us start with natural-language examples.
Example 1 The question:
What airline did Andrew travel by : BA, Ryanair, or Air France? (38)
along with:
Andrew travelled by BA or Air France if , and only if he arrived in
the morning, and by Ryanair if , and only if he arrived in the evening. (39)
(erotetically) imply the question:
When did Andrew arrive : in the morning, or in the evening? (40)
Example 2 The question:
Is Andrew lying? (41)
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together with:
Andrew lies if , and only if he speaks very slowly. (42)
imply:
Does Andrew speak very slowly? (43)
Example 3 The question:
Did Andrew travel by BA, or by Ryanair, or by neither? (44)
implies:
Did Andrew travel by BA? (45)
What do the above examples have in common? First, the following holds for all of
them:
(F1) If at least one direct answer to an implying question is true and the set of
declarative premises consists of truths, it is impossible that every direct answer to
the implied question is false.
A question is sound iff at least one direct answer to it is true, and unsound otherwise.
Thus (F1) can be concisely expressed as:
(F1∗) If the implying question is sound and the declarative premises are true, it is
impossible that the implied question is unsound.
As for Examples 2 and 3, condition (F1) is satisfied for trivial reasons, since the
implied questions are safe yes–no questions. But in the case of Example 1 it is fulfilled
non-trivially: although Andrew might have arrived neither in the morning nor in the
evening, this becomes impossible assuming that at least one direct answer to question
(38) is true and the premise (39) is true.
The set of direct answers to a question can be thought of as determining the prospec-
tive “search space” (or “class of relevant options”, if you prefer) required to be nar-
rowed down, in the optimal case to a singleton set. The second property shared by the
examples is the following:
(F2) Any expansion of the set of declarative premises by a direct answer to the
implied question results in narrowing down the initial search space determined by
(the set of direct answers to) the implying question.
For instance, if we expand the (set of) declarative premises of Example 1 by the
answer “In the morning” to the (implied) question (40), the remaining class of options
comprises BA and Air France, while the answer “In the evening” leaves a singleton
option, namely Ryanair. The case of Example 2 is even simpler, because the affirma-
tive answer to the implied question entails, along with the declarative premise, the
affirmative answer to the implying question, and similarly for negative answers. As
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for Example 3, the affirmative answer to the implied question resolves the implying
question, while after receiving the negative answer the initial three-element class of
options becomes narrowed down to a two-element class.
IEL defines erotetic implication in such a way that the effects sketched above occur
due to purely semantic reasons.
5.2 Definition of erotetic implication
As in Sect. 4, || stands for mc-entailment. Let us abbreviate ‘X∪{C}’ as ‘X, C’. Recall
that dQ designates the set of direct answers to Q. Here is the schema of definition of
erotetic implication:
Definition 14 (Erotetic implication) A question Q implies a question Q1 on the basis
of a set of d-wffs X (in symbols: Im(Q, X, Q1)) iff:
1. for each A ∈ dQ : X, A || dQ1, and
2. for each B ∈ dQ1 there exists a non-empty proper subset Y of dQ such that
X, B || Y .
Note that the respective Y ’s can (but need not) be singleton sets. Moreover, we do not
assume that X 
= ∅.
By putting ||cl for || we get the definition of classical erotetic implication, Imcl .
Notation. For Z = {C1, . . . , Cn}, ‘∨ Z ’ abbreviates ‘C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn’. Of course,∨{C1} = C1.
As for L?P (but, again, not in the general case!), one can define erotetic implication
without making use of the concept of mc-entailment. This is due to:
Corollary 7 Imcl(Q, X, Q1) iff
1. X,
∨
dQ |cl ∨ dQ1, and
2. for each B ∈ dQ1 there exists a non-empty proper subset Y of dQ such that
X, B |cl ∨ Y .
It is easily seen that clause (1) of Definition 14 warrants the fulfilment of condition
(F1). Concerning condition (F2): due to clause (2) of Definition 14, the set of declar-
ative premises extended by any direct answer to the implied question mc-entails a
proper subset of the set of direct answers to the implying question (or, to put it differ-
ently, entails either a direct answer or a disjunction of only some direct answers to the
question). So if a given direct answer to the implied question is true and X consists of
truths, the initial class of options offered by the implying question becomes narrowed
down, that is, roughly, there is a warranty that a true answer to the implying question
belongs to a certain class that is “smaller” than the initial class.21 What is important,
this condition holds for any direct answer to the implied question. Needless to say, the
respective proper subsets related to different answers are usually distinct.
21 Let us stress that narrowing down is not tantamount to elimination. For example, let Z = {p, p → q ∨r}
and W = {q, r, t}. Clearly, Z ||cl {q, r} and {q, r} is a proper subset of W , but Z does not eliminate any
d-wff in W . Similarly, elimination need not yield narrowing down. For instance, ¬q eliminates the d-wff q
of W , but does not mc-entail (in CL) any proper subset of W .
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5.2.1 Examples of erotetic implication
In presenting examples of erotetic implication we adopt similar conventions as in
Sect. 4.1.1. However, we use metalanguage variables for d-wffs and metalanguage
schemata instead of d-wffs themselves.
Imcl(?¬A, ?A) (46)
Imcl(?A, ?¬A) (47)
Imcl(? ± |A, B|, ?A) (48)
Imcl(? ± |A, B|, ?B) (49)
Imcl(?A, A → B, B → A, ?B) (50)
Imcl(?A, B → A, C → ¬A, B ∨ C, ?{B, C}) (51)
Imcl(?{A1, . . . , An}, A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An, ?A j ) (52)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Notation. For {A1, . . . , An}, ‘∨ A( j,k)’ abbreviates ‘A j ∨ A j+1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ak’.





where 1 < i ≤ n.




A(i,n), B ∨ C, ?{B, C}) (54)
where 1 < i ≤ n.
For further examples, properties, and types of erotetic implication see Wis´niewski
(1994, 1995, 2001, 2013). Let us add that erotetic implication links questions in the
so-called erotetic search scenarios22 and constitutes the background of the method of
Socratic proofs.23
5.3 Erotetic implication and possibilities
It can be proven that each question erotetically implies a question whose direct answers
express all the possibilities for the direct answers to the implying question.
Notation. Let Poss(A) stand for the set of possibilities for a d-wff A.
Recall that when A is inquisitive, then, by Lemma 6, Poss(A) is a finite at least
two-element set which comprises truth sets of some d-wffs. If A is not inquisitive,
then Poss(A) = {|A|}.
Let us observe that each truth set may be expressed by more than one d-wff (in fact,
by infinitely many d-wffs). For if A and B are CL-equivalent, then |A| = |B|, even if A
and B are syntactically distinct. Thus we may assume without loss of generality that
22 For this concept see, e.g., Wis´niewski (2003), and Wis´niewski (2013, Part III).
23 For most recent developments of the method see Leszczyn´ska-Jasion et al. (2013).
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d-wffs B11, . . . , B1k1 , . . . , Bn1 , . . . , Bnkn mentioned in the statement of Theorem 5
below are syntactically distinct.
Theorem 5 Let dQ = {A1, . . . , An} and let Poss(Ai ) = {|Bi1 |, . . . , |Biki |}. Then
Imcl(Q, Q♦), where dQ♦ = {B11, . . . , B1k1 , . . . , Bn1 , . . . Bnkn }.
Proof If Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is inquisitive, then for reasons indicated in the proof of
Theorem 3 we have Ai ||cl {Bi1 , . . . , Biki } and hence Ai ||cl dQ♦. If A is not
inquisitive, then Ai ||cl {Bi1} and therefore, again, Ai ||cl dQ♦.
Since each |Bi j | is a possibility for Ai (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ ki ), we have
|Bi j |  Ai and therefore Bi j ||cl {Ai }. unionsq
Thus a (propositional) question is, in a sense, reducible to a question whose direct
answers display all the possibilities for the direct answers to the initial question. Recall
that if |B| is a possibility for A, then B CL-entails A. Thus when the implied question
is answered, the implying question is answered as well.
Needless to say, the “questions about all the possibilities” are not the only questions
erotetically implied.
6 Concluding remarks
As we have shown, enriching the conceptual apparatus of IEL with the notion of
inquisitiveness results in revealing some important features of CL-evoked questions:
disjunctions of all their direct answers are inquisitive (cf. Corollary 6) and CL-evoked
questions are just these questions whose disjunctions of asserted direct answers are
inquisitive (Theorem 1). On the other hand, when we “liberalize” the concept of
question present in InqB, inquisitiveness of a formula amounts to evoking by the
formula a yes–no question with the affirmative answer expressing a possibility for the
formula (Theorem 2), and inquisitive formulas CL-evoke, among others, questions
about all the possibilities for the formulas (Theorem 3). Moreover, a question is, in
a sense, reducible to a question whose direct answers express all the possibilities for
the direct answers to the “initial” question (Theorem 5). What is more important than
the above formal results, however, is the inferential perspective gained: we are able
to model the phenomenon of arriving at inquisitive questions and/or questions about
possibilities.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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